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Incentives and Behavior in Markets – Summary 
Leonard Wolk 
 
 
Incentives shape behavior throughout society and are used to align interests 
between different market participants. By designing proper contracts or setting 
up market institutions to induce a certain behavior, operators of markets can 
steer participants' behavior. Evidence shows that it is not enough to design 
incentives in order to create well-functioning markets but we also need to study 
market participants' behavior in order to understand how markets function. In 
this dissertation, we therefore ask the following questions: How do incentives 
affect behavior? How is behavior shaped over time? and how do external factors, 
independent of incentives, affect market behavior? To answer these questions, 
we present four empirical studies which are summarized below. The first and 
last study of the dissertation deals primarily with incentives, whereas the second 
and third study investigates auction participants' behavior. 
The first study, chapter two, studies the effects of charity characteristics and 
underlying incentives on their cost-effectiveness using a panel of UK charities. 
Specifically, we study how the funding structure, representing the underlying 
structure of incentives, influences a charity's fundraising behavior. We 
disentangle the different types of funds and identify them as either restricted or 
unrestricted. Unrestricted funds can be spent freely by the charity, in contrast to 
restricted funds, which can only be spent on projects that fulfill specific 
requirements. If funds are largely restricted in their use, it is unlikely that the 
charity can spend the funds on risky projects or on projects to their own benefit. 
With this insight in mind we study the decision of a potential donor of both 
investing time and resources in specifying proper restrictions or donating 
resources unrestricted to a charity that he believes will spend these resources 
well. 
We show that changes in the funding structure significantly changes charity 
behavior. This result lends partial support to the existence of asymmetric 
information between the charity and the donor. This in turn implies that the 
decision whether or not to restrict funds has important consequences for charity 
operations. It is crucial to understand these dynamics in order to enhance our 
understanding of how to efficiently regulate and govern the non-profit industry. 
Chapter three looks at individual behavior in internet auctions. Specifically, we 
study the role of experience in internet art auctions by analyzing repeated 
bidding by the same bidder in a unique longitudinal field dataset. If experience 
plays a significant role in shaping bidding behavior, it can have a large impact 
on the design of auction markets. We find that bidders adapt their bidding 
strategies over time. Our evidence points toward the possibility for an 
auctioneer to increase revenues by adapting its focus to attract novice bidders. 
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Chapter four examines the valuation and hence auction prices for art in London. 
The value of art is determined, on the one hand by its future resale value and, 
on the other hand, by the emotional utility derived from owning the object. For 
art traded at an auction both components play important roles. Interestingly, 
these two components have very different characteristics from an auction theory 
point of view. The investment value will, at any point in time, and for a fixed 
horizon, be identical for all bidders, even though they have different information 
about it. This resembles a common value good, where every bidder only receives 
a noisy signal of the true value of the good. The emotional utility, on the other 
hand, is strictly personal. The value someone derives from viewing a painting is 
independent from that of all other bidders. Thus, the emotional value represents 
a private value good. We proxy for the variation in emotional value using 
variation in mood arising from changes in the amount of sunshine and rainfall. 
Our research suggests that there are important insights from understanding the 
role of emotions in auctions. The implications of our results are important to art 
auction participants. By inferring the nature of the good being sold, bidders can 
make informed judgments about the value that they attach to an item. Our 
findings highlight the importance of the source of the value attached to an item 
and its relation to the relative importance of the private and common value 
components. 
In chapter five we study the importance of monetary incentives in prediction 
markets. Prediction markets enable market based forecasting of future events. 
With the use of a double auction, public information is absorbed into market 
prices that directly translate into probabilities of future events occurring. The 
importance of monetary incentives on the aggregation of the traders' beliefs is 
not yet well understood. In particular, we study the co-movement between 
prediction markets based on real- and play-money that were run simultaneously. 
We exploit the fact that the play-money market was set up to constantly mimic 
the price of the real-money market and test whether or not, despite the imposed 
price reversion toward the real-money market, the markets co-move. 
We find that 20% of the contract pairs with non-stationary price series do not co-
move. This means that for these contracts the play-money market absorbs 
information from the public systematically differently in comparison to the real-
money market. This evidence is significant in the light of the price manipulation 
scheme set up to synchronize the two markets. For the remaining 80% of the 
contract pairs, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the price series co-move. 
